By Tommaso Pavone, University of Toronto
March 20, 2025
From the Impossible to the Inevitable?
In penning his piece titled “How Canada could get much closer to Europe,” Frédéric Mérand has done Canadians, Europeans, and fellow academics a huge favor. To riff off John Lennon, it is heartening to realize that we are not the only dreamers pondering the integration of Canada and the European Union (EU). If as astute and grounded a commentator as Mérand shares this dream, could it not become true? I think Mérand did an excellent job in outlining why this is, in fact, a dream and not a nightmare –why greater Canada-EU ties and even eventual Canadian accession would be desirable. I want to add three thoughts on why this prospect is not pie in the sky, but is in fact more realistic than even Mérand lets on.
There are many momentous political events in recent history that were presumed impossible until they happened and were recast as inevitable: the fall of the Soviet Union, Brexit, Russia’s war of aggression at the EU’s doorstep, the autocratization of the US, the sudden resurrection of the Liberal Party in Canada, to name but a few. Canada-EU integration may not yet be inevitable, but we are living in a historical moment where its air of impossibility is rapidly evaporating. In the interest of accelerating this evaporation, here are three reasons why Canadian accession to the EU – or a much deeper process of Canada-EU integration – is more feasible than we think.
The Political Feasibility of Canada-EU Integration
Mérand begins by acknowledging the elephant in the room: “Canada is not on the European continent which, in principle, is a condition for accession.” This geographic obstacle appears insurmountable, but in my view it does not exist, neither in territorial reality nor under law. In reality, the EU is arguably already Canada’s neighbor, and parts of the EU are already “in” Canada. Under law, Canada can be a “European state” and accede to the EU if the political will is there.
To begin, the EU’s territory and jurisdiction already spills well beyond continental Europe. Current EU member states – like Ireland – are not on the European continent. The EU’s territory spans across 9 Overseas Regions (ORs) – like Réunion in the Indian Ocean and the Canary Islands in the Atlantic – where virtually the entire corpus of EU law – the acquis communautaire – applies in full. Thirteen semi-autonomous islands comprise Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs) with their own legal association agreements with the EU – from Greenland in the North Atlantic to Saint Maarten in the Caribbean to French Polynesia in the Pacific. Canada shares a land border with one of these OCTs – Greenland – and a 15-mile maritime border with another OCT – Saint Pierre et Miquelon. Although OCTs are technically not EU territories, their nationals are EU citizens, and their courts are considered European courts that fall under the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) when applying EU law and are thus capable of referring cases to the ECJ. Canada, of course, is neither an OR nor an OCT, yet even in Toronto, Calgary, and Vancouver we already experience the extraterritorial reach EU law due to what Anu Bradford calls “the Brussels Effect.” Because Canadian businesses and the Canadian government want access to the EU’s lucrative market, they already comply with many EU regulations, such as the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). You might think the EU’s borders and jurisdiction would have to make a huge leap across the Atlantic for Canada to accede to the EU, but in fact the EU and its laws have already made that leap.
Next, nothing in EU law precludes EU member states to define “European state” in non-geographic terms so as to include Canada. Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) merely states that “any European State which respects the values referred to in Article 2 [i.e. democracy, the rule of law, and fundamental rights] and is committed to promoting them may apply to become a member of the Union.” Not only does the Treaty thus emphasize values while explicitly omitting geography as a criteria for accession, but as the European Parliament’s legal service underscores, “European state” “can be read equally well in geographical, cultural or political terms,” and “it is at all events a criterion subject to political assessment.” Put differently, “European state” means whatever EU member states choose it to mean, so long as the state in question respects liberal democratic values. Indeed, there is good historical sense in not reifying “Europe” in geographic terms: As Norman Davies has demonstrated in his magisterial Europe: A History, there has never been any agreement on “Europe” as a geographic entity, and there are equally if not more compelling conceptions of Europe as a community of values or an ideal of political unity. The EU Treaties embrace this political and values-based conception. On these criteria, ask yourself: which country is more “European” today: Hungary, which is in the EU, or Canada, which hitherto is not? In my mind, the answer is obvious.
Mérand then mentions a second obstacle: “more importantly, we still trade very little with Europe compared to the U.S.” Again, I believe he is being too hard on his own argument: the fact that Canada is a relatively small economy that trades less with the EU is a political virtue, not an obstacle. Why? Mérand already underscores the benefits of incentivizing Canada to diversify its trade and to break away from its dependence on the US market. But additionally, the inconceivability of a tsunami of Canadian goods flooding into the EU market is a political asset. Consider the case of agricultural trade and what happened the second Ukraine was granted EU candidate status and received temporary barrier-free access to the EU single market. Farmers from Poland to France mobilized in recalcitrant opposition to Ukrainian agricultural products entering freely into the EU. Even in Poland – perhaps Ukraine’s most stalwart European ally since Russia’s war of aggression – farmers formed a blockade at the Ukrainian border and sabotaged grain exports by boarding trains and emptying their contents onto the tracks. Politically speaking, trade and economic power can count against you in the accession process. Do you want to be an enticing new member of the EU? Then share its liberal-democratic values without posing too much of a competitive threat to French or Polish farmers!
Third, Mérand mentions that Canada-EU integration need not mean full membership: there are less transformational but nonetheless beneficial association agreements that may be worth prioritizing because of their greater feasibility. These could, for instance, draw on the Norway model: European Economic Area (EEA) Agreement membership and inclusion in the EU Single Market and Schengen free movement zone. Or they could draw on the Switzerland model: the Norway substituting bilateral treaties for the EEA Agreement. Prime Minister Mark Carney has hinted towards one of these in-between options when he recently told French President Emmanuel Macron that Canada is the “most European of non-European countries.”
But in my view, these in-between scenarios are second-best: as the Norwegians have found out, if you are going to be a rule-taker and implement the vast majority of EU laws, why not also be a rule-maker and gain the political voice that only comes with full membership? In any case, even if one prefers something short of full-fledged EU membership, pushing for the most radical and transformative option makes good strategic sense. To invoke an illuminating analogy from the US, LGBTQ rights advocates soon realized that if they pushed for marriage equality, which the public initially perceived as radical, then other policy reforms – like nondiscrimination laws and domestic partnership benefits – would rise in popularity because they appeared like moderate compromises. Even if you want to end up with the Swiss scenario (domestic partnership benefits), you should still advocate for the full EU membership scenario (marriage).
When Necessity Comes Knocking
Frédéric Mérand’s call to seriously consider the prospect of Canadian accession to the EU is not merely desirable – it is also more feasible and pragmatic an exercise than may appear at first glance. Canada and the EU need each other, and there is no reason why they cannot transition from being friendly neighbors to living together and getting married. In a world of betrayed alliances, liberal-democratic retreat, and the collapse of the rules-based international order, what was once deemed impossible is quickly being recast as possible, and soon Canadian accession to the EU may even appear necessary. And necessity, as Jacques Delors emphasized in his 1989 Bruges speech, has always been a driving force of European integration.
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